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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890231

v.
Category No. 13

CHAD A. GARDINER,
Defendant-Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed defendant's
conviction of assault on a peace officer under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.4 (Supp. 1989) by order dated April 14, 1989 (R. 28).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals correctly rule that

"[d]efendant had no right to resist a peaceful search, regardless
of whether that search might ultimately be determined legal or
illegal, unless defendant can show that the officer was not
reasonably identified as a police officer, was not acting
pursuant to his authority, or had used excessive force?"
2.

Did the court of appeals properly uphold the trial

court's conclusion that "the officer reasonably acted to preserve
his own safety when he pushed defendant away and that the force
used was not excessive?"

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented
for review is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Chad A. Gardiner, was charged with two
counts of assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (Supp. 1989), one count of
interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest, a class
B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1989), and
one count of intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-701 (Supp. 1989) (R. 7). After a bench trial in
circuit court, defendant was found guilty of one count of assault
on a peace officer and of interference with a peace officer
making a lawful arrest; the court found him not guilty on the
remaining counts (R. 16). Defendant was sentenced to a term of
one year in the Uintah County Jail and fined $400 (plus $100
surcharge) for the assault on a peace officer conviction;
however, the court suspended execution of that sentence and
placed defendant on probation

(R. 19). There is nothing in the

record to indicate what sentence, if any, the court imposed for
the interference with a peace officer conviction.
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of
Appeals (R. 20). In an order issued pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App.
31, the court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction of
assault on a peace officer (R. 27, 28). For some unexplained
reason, the court of appeals did not address the interference

conviction, and neither party sought correction of this apparent
oversight.
This Court granted defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari (R. 30).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court's findings of fact, which generally are
not challenged by defendant,

were as follows:

1. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on April 17, 1989,
Deputy Lytle of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department,
[sic] was dispatched to the Vernal City Airport. Deputy
Lytle was dispatched on a complaint by an unidentified
citizen that a loud party was in process at the airport and
that minors were consuming alcohol.
2. Vernal City Officer Steve Hatzidakis and Reserve
Officer Terry Shiner, [sic] responded to assist Deputy Lytle
at the airport and were provided the above information
concerning the party.
3. The officers located a party which involved from 30
to 50 people. The party was apparently being held at the
Dinaland Aviation Building. There were numerous people
outside the building, some of which were in the vicinity of
airplanes which were parked near the building.
4. Officer Hatzidakis initially located two
individuals within a vehicle near the above building. Upon
contact, the officer found that one of the individuals was
obviously very intoxicated from the consumption of alcohol.
5. Deputy Lytle initially contacted another vehicle
where he found an open container of alcohol in the vehicle.
6. While the officers were in the process of making
contact with the vehicles, someone began to close the door
to the Aviation Building. Officer Hatzidakis requested
Reserve Officer Shiner, [sic] to investigate this action.
Deputy Shiner responded to the building and made contact
with several individuals in the vicinity of the doorway (one
of which was a member of a band which was apparently
performing at the party).

Defendant does
fact, except for
defendant by one
reasonable under

not attack any of the trial court's findings of
its finding that the force used against
of the arresting officers was not excessive but
the circumstances (R. 16 at 2 ) .

7. Officer Hatzidakis also went to the doorway of the
Aviation Building. Upon his arrival at the doorway, he
observed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.
8. Upon looking inside the building, Officer
Hatzidakis, [sic] observed one or two individuals who
appeared to be minors. The Court has observed some of the
persons who were within the building and finds that at least
one of the individuals who was within the building at the
time Officer Hatzidakis looked in, reasonably appeared to be
a minor.
9. After observing persons who he believed to be
minors within the building, after having observed the
general use of alcohol in the area, and after having noted a
heavy odor of alcohol at the entrance to the building,
Officer Hatzidakis announced his intention to enter the
premises to check the area within the building for minors.
Officer Hatzidakis informed those present of the
reasons that he had dispatched to the area (this involved a
loud party and the consumption of alcohol by minors).
10. The defendant, who was within the building, then
informed Officer Hatzidakis that his father owned the
Dinaland Aviation Building. The defendant also gave Officer
Hatzidakis his name. The foregoing exchange between the
officer and the defendant occurred at the doorway or just
inside the door.
11. During the exchange of information between the
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, the defendant inquired as
to whether the officer possessed a warrant. When he was
informed by the officer that the officer had no warrant, the
defendant announced that the [o]fficer could not enter the
premises. At about that time, the defendant stepped within
8 to 10 inches of Officer Hatzidakis and reached his arm out
to his side to a table in order to prevent the officer from
entering. The demeanor of the defendant was hostile and
threatening.
12. Officer Hatzidakis reasonably perceived the action
of defendant to be a threat to his safety and in response to
defendant's actions, shoved the defendant away. The Court
finds that the force used was not excessive and that it was
reasonable in view of the circumstances.
13. The defendant, after having recovered from the
shove by Officer Hatzidakis, came forward and struck Officer
Hatzidakis in the face with his (defendant's) fist. The
force of the defendant's blow and the resulting contact
between the defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, [sic] knocked
the officer outside where an altercation occurred between

the defendant and all three police officers who were
present.
14. During the altercation, Officer Hatzidakis
informed the defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant
heard and understood this announcement and answered that he
was not under arrest. After having been informed of his
arrest, the defendant vigorously resisted arrest and in the
process again struck Officer Hatzidakis in the face with his
(defendant's) fist.
15. Dinaland Aviation has at least three exits to the
building. There were from 30 to 40 people present.
Approximately 15 to 20 people were located within the
building or immediately adjacent (at the doorway) to the
building. The remaining individuals were scattered around
the parking lot and airplane storage area which was adjacent
to the building.
16. The Dinaland Aviation building is a commercial
building which is not used as a residence. The building is
used to accommodate parties two or three times a year.
(R. 16 at 1-3) .
The court made the following conclusions of law:
1. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe
that alcohol was being used and consumed within the building
known as Dinaland Aviation and that alcohol was located in
the building.
2. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe
that minors were located within the building known as
Dinaland Aviation.
3. Officer Hatzidakis had received information from an
anonymous informant that minors were consuming alcohol.
4. Officer Hatzidakis had received additional
information regarding the activity at Dinaland Aviation that
morning, which information had been verified to be accurate.
5. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe
that there were minors within the building known as Dinaland
Aviation who had consumed alcohol.
6. In light of all the circumstances, which include
the early morning hours, the fact that there were only three
police officers present, the fact that there were at least
three exits to the hanger[,] the fact that there were
numerous people who were spread over a wide area in the
vicinity of the building, the fact that it was a commercial
building, the fact that the officer had probable cause to

believe that the offense was occurring in his presence, the
probability that evidence and individuals would not be
available if a Warrant was obtained, and all other facts
surrounding this event, the Court finds that it was
reasonable to enter without first obtaining a Warrant.
Additional factors which the Court considered are noted on
the record on the hearing held July 15, 1988.
(R. 16 at 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly affirmed defendant's
conviction of assault on a peace officer on the ground that
defendant had no right to forcibly resist a search by a peace
officer in the performance of his duties, even though the search
was subsequently determined to be illegal.
Based on the foregoing, defendant's conviction of
interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest is also
sustainable.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
The order issued by the court of appeals affirms only
defendant's conviction of assault on a peace officer; it does not
address defendant's conviction of interference with a peace
officer.

This appears to have been an oversight, as defendant

clearly challenged both of his convictions in that court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT HAD NO RIGHT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO RESIST THE SEARCH CONDUCTED
BY ONE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS.
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in
concluding that under the circumstances, defendant had no right
to resist the entry into the Dinaland Aviation building by one of

the arresting officers.

First, he argues that the following

conclusion of the court of appeals conflicts with this Court's
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975):
Defendant had no right to resist a peaceful
search, regardless of whether that search
might ultimately be determined legal or
illegal, unless defendant can show that the
officer was not reasonably identified as a
police officer, was not acting pursuant to
his authority, or had used excessive force.
Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Alaska
1983). Accord U.S. v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381,
390 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert, denied 402 U.S.
1008 (1971); State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583
P.2d 464, 466-7 (1978) .
State v. Gardiner, No. 880557-CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App.
April 14, 1989) (unpublished "Order of Affirmance") (R. 28 at 2).
Second, he contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1978)
(defense of property) provides an independent justification for
his resistance to the officer's entry.

Third, he argues that,

because the officer lacked a legal basis to make a warrantless
entry into the building, that entry was unlawful under the fourth
amendment, and the officer was therefore acting outside the scope
of his authority.

Finally, he maintains that his resistance was

justified under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) (self-defense)
because the officer used excessive force to effect the entry.
Each of these arguments will be addressed separately.
As noted by the court of appeals, on appeal to that
court the parties focused on the legality of the officer's entry
into the Dinaland Aviation building, apparently assuming that the
answer to that question would be dispositive.

However, the court

of appeals determined otherwise. Although it "agree[d] with
defendant that there were no exigent circumstances that permitted

the police officer to legally conduct a warrantless search of the
premises for alcohol being served to minors/' it concluded that
M

[t]he legality or illegality of the search cannot justify

defendant's conduct nor excuse his offense."
at 1 (R. 28).

Gardiner, slip op.

In addition to the statement quoted above

regarding the defendant's right to resist a peaceful search, the
court of appeals said:
We reject defendant's argument that he
is entitled to resist a search which he deems
to be illegal. Any traditional common law
sanction for such conduct is anachronistic
and no longer justifiable. See People v.
Hess, 687 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1984). When
society has provided other adequate legal
means to obtain an impartial review and
resolution of legal disputes, the necessity
for a self-help remedy, such as physically
resisting an officer who is performing his
duty, is radically dissipated. Our society
need no longer tolerate such efforts.
Ellison v. State, 410 P.2d 519, 525 (Del.
Super. 1979). The resistance to a
questionable search or arrest can lead to
violence and injury, as in this case. Selfhelp may well invite graver consequences to
the accused and the officer than any injury
occasioned by the search or arrest itself.
State v. Doe, 583 P.2d at 467; State v.
Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46
(1977) .
Gardiner, slip op. at 2-3 (R. 28 at 2-3). Defendant maintains
that the lower court's holding on this point is contrary to this
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw.
In

Bradshaw, the Court had before it the question of

whether the predecessor to current Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305

2
(Supp. 1989)

was unconstitutionally vague.

In holding that the

statute was defective in that respect, the Court focused on two
of its parts, including the phrase:
is a legal basis for the arrest."

"regardless of whether there

Regarding this phrase, the

lead opinion, in dictum, observed:
If the intention of the legislature was to
penalize a law-abiding citizen by
incarceration because he did not willingly
submit to an unlawful arrest, a statute
authorizing the same is in violation of both
the Utah and United States Constitutions
. . . in that it permits and authorizes an
arrest without probable cause and without
lawful basis for the arrest.
541 P.2d at 801 (Tuckett, J., joined by Maughan, J . ) . In a
separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Henriod clearly agreed
with this dictum, thus giving it majority support.

541 P.2d at

802-05 (Henriod, C.J., concurring).
This language of Bradshaw, which admittedly suggests
that a majority of the Court adopted the common law rule that a
person could resist an unlawful arrest with impunity, is only
dictum and does not represent the holding of Bradshaw.

The

holding of that case is limited to the issue of the statute's
vagueness.

Therefore, whatever relevance Bradshaw may have to

the question of a person's right to forcibly resist an unlawful
search by a peace officer, it does not have the precedential
2
Former section 76-8-305 read:
A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes
with a person recognized to be a law
enforcement official seeking to effect an
arrest or detention of himself or another
regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest.

value defendant wishes to attribute to it.

See/ e.g., State v.

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989) ("The referenced language
in the lead opinion [of State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1200-01
(Utah 1984),] was dictum only.").

Bradshaw simply did not

determine the question of whether a person may resist an unlawful
search or seizure (including arrest).
This Court must decide what appears to be a question of
first impression in Utah:

does a person have a right to resist

an unlawful search of a non-dwelling by a peace officer without
the threat of punishment under the criminal laws?

See State v.

Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (observing that
the issue of whether a private citizen has a right to resist an
unlawful arrest has not been resolved in Utah).

Because there is

no direct statutory authority in the current criminal code upon
which to decide this question, a resolution must be fashioned
3
purely by judicial decision.
Under the common law, a person had che right to use
force to resist an unlawful arrest.

Regina v. Tooley, 2 Ld.

Raymond Rep. 1296, 1299-1301 (Q.B. 1709).

See also People v.

Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo. 1984); State v. Gallagher, 465
A.2d 323, 327 (Conn. 1983).

Although a number of states continue

to follow the common law rule, see, e.g., Brown v. City of
Oklahoma City, 721 P.2d 1346 (Okl. App.), cert, granted and
denied, 721 P.2d 1356 (Okl. 1986), the modern view, adopted by a

The applicability of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-402 (self-defense),
76-2-405 (defense of habitation), 76-2-406 (defense of property),
and 76-8-305 (1978 & Supp. 1989) to the specific facts of this
case is necessarily limited by the language of those provisions.
Each will be discussed below.

clear majority of the states either by legislative enactment or
judicial decision, is that a person may not resist an unlawful
arrest which is accomplished without excessive force.

See

Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 599-600, 447 N.E.2d 1224,
1227 (1983) (collecting cases and statutes); Brown v. City of
Oklahoma City, 721 P.2d at 1355-56 (Stubblefield, J., dissenting)
(same).

The Moreira court explained the modern view as follows:
[T]he trend in this country has been away
from the old rule [established in Regina v.
Tooley in 1709] and toward the resolution of
disputes in court. Since 1709, society has
changed. In this era of constantly expanding
legal protection of the rights of the accused
in criminal proceedings, an arrestee may be
reasonably required to submit to a possibly
unlawful arrest and to take recourse in the
legal processes available to restore his
liberty. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super.
169, 183-184, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 450-451,
511 P.2d 263 (1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S.
1163, 94 S.Ct. 928, 39 L.Ed.2d 117 (1974).
An arrestee has the benefit of liberal bail
laws, appointed counsel, the right to remain
silent and to cut off questioning, speedy
arraignment, and speedy trial. State v.
Richardson, supra 95 Idaho at 450, 511 P.2d
263. Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d 173,
179, 324 N.E.2d 735, cert, denied, 423 U.S.
872, 95 S.Ct. 138, 48 L.Ed.2d 102 (1975). As
a result of these rights and procedural
safeguards, the need for the common law rule
disappears — self help by an arrestee has
become anachronistic. People v. Curtis, 70
Cal.2d 347, 353, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d
33 (1969). In the Matter of the Welfare of
Burns, 284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979). As
the New Jersey court wrote, self-help "is
antisocial in an urbanized society." State
v. Koonce, supra 89 N.J.Super, at 184, 214
A.2d 428.

388 Mass. at 599-600, 447 N.E.2d at 1226-27 (footnote omitted).
In sum, the generally accepted, and better reasoned, rule is that

in the absence of excessive or unnecessary
force by an arresting officer, a person may
not use force to resist an arrest by one who
he knows or has good reason to believe is an
authorized police officer, engaged in the
performance of his duties, regardless of
whether the arrest was unlawful in ^:he
circumstances.
388 Mass. at 601, 447 N.E.2d at 1227. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8305 (Supp. 1989).4
The principle that one generally has no right to resist
arrest whether or not it is lawful has been extended by a number
of courts to searches conducted with and without warrants.

E.g.

Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Alaska 1983)
(warrantless search); State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 102-03, 583 P.2d
464, 466-67 (N.M. 1978) (warrantless search); State v. Hatton,
116 Ariz. 142, 147-48, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (Ariz. 1977) (en
banc) (warrant search); United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381,

Section 76-8-305 reads:
A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if he has knowledge or by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to
effect a lawful arrest or detention of
himself or another and interferes with such
arrest or detention by use of force or by use
of any weapon.
(Emphasis added). Whether the limitation to "lawful arrest" in
this section reflects an implicit adoption by the legislature of
the common law rule that a person has the right to resist an
unlawful arrest is not clear. If that was the legislature's
intent here, it is not clear that such resistance would be
justified for purposes of any statute (e.g., section 76-5102*4 -- assault on a peace officer) other than section 76-8-305.
In any event, this Court need not decide this question in
order to resolve the issue of the right to resist an unlawful
search which, as noted previously, is not directly controlled by
any statutory authority.

389-90 (3rd Cir.) (warrant search), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 1008
(1971).

In Elson, the court stated:

[W]e hold that a private citizen may not use
force to resist a peaceful search by one he
knows or has good reason to believe is an
authorized police officer performing his
duties, regardless of whether the search is
ultimately determined to be illegal.
5
659 P.2d at 1200 (footnote omitted).
As explained in Doe,
another warrantless search case:
Self-help measures undertaken by a
potential defendant who objects to the
legality of the search can lead to violence
and serious physical injury. The societal
interest in the orderly settlement of
disputes between citizens and their
government outweighs any individual interest
in resisting a questionable search. . . .
One can reasonably be asked to submit
peaceably and to take recourse in his legal
remedies.
92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 466-67 (citations omitted).

And

in the warrant search situation, the Ferrone court reasoned:
Society has an interest in securing for
its members the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Society
also has an interest, however, in the orderly
settlement of disputes between citizens and
their government; it has an especially strong
interest in minimizing the use of violent
self-help in the resolution of those
disputes. We think a proper accommodation of
those interests requires that a person
claiming to be aggrieved by a search
5 The court added in a footnote:
We again caution that this rule does not
apply when the officer uses excessive or
unnecessary force in conducting the search or
when the search is attempted by one not known
to be or not reasonably identifiable as a
peace officer.
659 P.2d at 1200 n.18 (citations omitted).

conducted by a peace officer pursuant to an
allegedly invalid warrant test that claim in
a court of law and not forcibly resist the
execution of the warrant at the place of
search.
438 F.2d at 390.6
However, other courts have been reluctant to extend the
principle to searches.

For example, in State v. Gallagher, 465

A.2d 323 (Conn. 1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court, while
recognizing that a person has no right to resist an unlawful
arrest under Connecticut law and that the arguments in favor of
that approach "apply in some measure to resistance to an unlawful
entry," held that it would "continue to adhere to the common law
view that there are circumstances where unlawful warrantless
intrusion into the home creates a privilege to resist, and that
punishment of such resistance is therefore improper." Id., at 328

Although Ferrone held that a person does not have a right to
forcibly resist the execution of a search warrant by a peace
officer, even though that warrant may subsequently be ruled
invalid, .id. at 390, the court explicitly stated:
We do not decide in this case:
(a) Whether a person would, under some
circumstances, have a right to resist an
unlawful warrantless search;
(b) Whether a person would, under some
circumstances, have a right to resist an
unlawful arrest made with or without a
warrant;
(c) Whether there may be some unlawful
arrests or searches, with or without warrant,
the circumstances of which would be such a
provocation to a reasonable man that the
seriousness of the offense of resistance
ought to be mitigated as a result of such
provocation. See, generally, Chevigny, Paul
G., The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest,
78 Yale L.J. 1128 (1969).
Id. at 390 n.19 (emphasis in original).

(citations omitted).

The court "refused to abrogate the common

law privilege to offer reasonable resistance, not rising to the
level of an assault, to an unlawful entry." Ibid.

It explained:

Recognition of a limited right to resist
an unlawful entry as a defense to a charge of
interference seems to us to accommodate the
competing claims of the common law and of our
statutes.
Id. at 329 n.7.

Clearly, the court was most concerned about an

unlawful entry into a private home.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached a similar
conclusion in People v. Lutz, 762 P.2d 715 (Colo. App. 1988),
where it drew a clear distinction between the right to resist an
illegal arrest (no such right under People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443
(Colo. 1984)) and the "independent privilege to resist an
unlawful intrusion into the sanctuary of a private home." I_d. at
716 (citation omitted).

Finding that the Colorado statute

abrogating the right to resist an unlawful arrest is inapplicable
where the forcible resistance is to prevent an unlawful entry,
the court refused to create an exception to Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-1-705 (1986) -- which justified the use of reasonable and
appropriate force to repel a trespasser in or upon a building --,
whereby the statute would not apply when the unlawful entry is
made by police officers. Id. at 717. The court considered "the
topic to be one for legislative, not judicial, action."

As was

the court in Gallagher, the Lutz court was most concerned about
an unlawful entry into one's home.
With the foregoing in mind, this Court, in the context
of the instant case, must decide a fairly narrow question:

to

what extent, if any, may a person resist an unlawful search of a
non-dwelling by a peace officer?

Although perhaps a closer

question in the unlawful search context than in the unlawful
arrest context, the policy considerations weigh in favor of the
rule adopted in Elson and applied by the court of appeals to the
facts of this case:

in the absence of excessive force by an

officer, a person may not use force to resist a search by one he
knows or has reason to believe is an authorized peace officer
performing his duties, regardless of whether the search is
ultimately determined to be illegal.

Even though valid

distinctions may be drawn between an arrest and a search, see
Lutz, 762 P.2d at 716-17; Gallagher, 465 A.2d at 327-28, and
perhaps to a lesser extent between a search made pursuant to a
warrant and a warrantless search, compare Brown, 721 P.2d at
1351-52, with Ferrone, 438 F.2d at 389-90, a bright-line rule
prohibiting forcible resistance to any unlawful search which is
conducted without excessive force by the police will promote
orderly, rather than violent, resolution of disputes over the
legality of a particular search.

Such a rule is particularly

desirable given that the legality of a search, like that of an
arrest, may often be a close question as to which even lawyers
and judges may disagree.

See Moreira, 388 Mass. at 600, 447

N.E.2d at 1227. This sort of close question "is more properly
decided by a [court] rather than by the participants in what may
well be a highly volatile imbroglio."

Ibid, (citations omitted).

The bleak picture painted in opposition by the court in Brown,
for example, is unrealistic in light of the well established
legal remedies, both criminal and civil, that are available to
the aggrieved individual and are specifically designed to deter
and to punish police misconduct.

See United State v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897 (1984) (absent objective good faith of officer,
illegally seized evidence is to be suppressed); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1981) (under which a civil action for damages against police
officers for federal constitutional violations is available).
Individual officers may also be subject to administrative
disciplinary action from their departments and the Division of
Peace Officer Standards and Training (see Utah Code Ann. § 67-1510.5 (Supp. 1989)).
In applying the rule argued for by the State to the
instant case, the Court need only consider its application to the
specific facts presented -- i.e., an illegal search of a nono

dwelling.

This is so because it is unclear whether Utah Code

The majority in Brown writes:
The alternative of denying the right [to
forcibly resist an unlawful search], it seems
to us, would create the potential for greater
mischief -- a license for unrestrained
wielding of arbitrary power eventually
degenerating into gestapo and KGB type
terrorism -- in short a police state.
721 P.2d at 1352.
g
For purposes of this case, the State is willing to assume that
the court of appeals was correct in its determination that the
search by the officer was illegal due to the absence of exigent
circumstances. This is so because the State firmly believes
that, as a matter of policy, the Elson rule represents the better
view. Under that rule, legality of the search is irrelevant.
The State believes that it is important for this Court to decide
whether the Elson rule should be adopted.

Ann. S 76-2-405 (Supp. 1989) gives a person the right to resist
an unlawful entry into his or her habitation when that entry is
sought by a peace officer in the performance of the officer's
duties.

Section 76-2-405 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is justified in using force
against another when and to the extent that
he reasonably believers that the force is
necessary to prevent or terminate the other's
unlawful entry into or attack upon his
habitation[.] . . .

That provision does not include an explicit exception for peace
officers in the performance of their duties, and whether this
Court would create such an exception is a question better left
for another day.

Cjf. Lutz, 762 P. 2d at 717 (refusing to create

an exception to a similar statute in Colorado).

In the instant

case, the trial court specifically found that the Dinaland
Aviation building was not a residence (Finding of Fact No. 16; R.
16 at 3), and defendant does not argue that section 76-2-405
provides a justification for his actions.
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of
defendant's case, the court of appeals correctly upheld his
conviction of assault on a peace officer.

Under those same

Cont. However, if the Court wishes to analyze the legality of
the search as a predicate to its decision, the State maintains
that the officer's warrantless entry was supported by probable
cause (which is not challenged by defendant) and exigent
circumstances. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987);
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13 (1986) (unlawful for minor to possess
or consume alcohol). Although admittedly a close question, the
trial court's ruling that the search was legal was not clearly
erroneous. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1269. Reversal of the court of
appeals on this point would, of course, make it unnecessary to
examine the validity of the Elson rule. Defendant does not argue
that he had a right to resist a lawful search, and there appears
to be no authority for such a position.
-18-

principles, defendant's conviction of interference with a peace
officer is also sustainable.
Looking first at the assault conviction, the trial
court found defendant guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-5102.4 (Supp. 1989), which provides:
Any person who assaults a peace officer,
with knowledge that he is a peace officer,
and when the peace officer is acting within
the scope of his authority as a peace
officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
As is clear from the court's findings of fact, defendant's
assault against Officer Hatzidakis was related to defendant's
efforts to prevent the officer from entering the Dinaland
Aviation building to check for minors who the officer suspected
were consuming alcohol.

At trial, defendant argued that the

officer's warrantless entry into the building was an unlawful
search under the fourth amendment because, even assuming the
officer had probable cause to support a search, the warrantless
entry could not be justified due to the absence of exigent
circumstances (R. 14). Defendant claimed that the unlawful
entry, coupled with the alleged use of excessive force by the
officer in making the entry, justified defendant's forcible
resistance to that entry.

The trial court rejected defendant's

arguments, concluding that the officer's warrantless entry was
supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances (R.
16).
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant presented
essentially the same arguments as he did in the trial court.

In

its order of affirmance, issued pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 31,
the court of appeals, without discussion of the trial court's
findings of fact or conclusions of law, agreed with defendant
that the absence of exigent circumstances rendered the officer's
warrantless search illegal.

However, noting that defendant had

not challenged the trial court's findings that "the officer
reasonably acted to preserve his own safety when he pushed
defendant away and that the force used was not excessive," the
court of appeals, applying Elson v. State and other similar cases
discussed above, held that defendant was not justified in
forcibly resisting the search.
In this Court, defendant correctly argues that one may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in business premises and
thus enjoy certain protections under the fourth amendment.

See

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).
And, there is no dispute that a warrantless entry by police into
a protected area in the absence of exigent circumstances, or some
other recognized exception to the warrant requirement,
constitutes an illegal search under the fourth amendment.
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

See

As already

noted, the court of appeals, assuming—as did defendant—that
Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to conduct a search,
concluded that there were no exigent circumstances to justify his

It is unclear why the court of appeals issued a summary order
in this case under rule 31, given that the legal basis for its
decision was one that had not been clearly developed in Utah.
Indeed, as defendant pointed out in his petition for rehearing to
the court of appeals, its d€?cision was arguably inconsistent with
dictum in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975).

warrantless search.

Although this appears to be a very close

question given the circumstances of the police encounter with
defendant and others at the scene (see discussion in this brief,
supra at n.8),

cf_. State v. Ashe, the court of appeals

properly concluded that the legality of the search was not the
relevant issue.

As previously discussed, the better rule is that

which was applied by the court of appeals:

a person may not use

force to resist a search conducted without excessive force by one
he knows or has reason to believe is an authorized peace officer
performing his duties, regardless of whether the search is
ultimately determined to be illegal.

Because defendant makes no

claim that he did not know or have reason to believe Officer
Hatzidakis was a peace officer performing his duties, his
forcible resistance to the search cannot be excused simply
because the search may have been illegal.

There also is some question about whether defendant had
standing under the fourth amendment to object to what he believed
was an illegal search. While the trial court specifically found
that defendant informed Officer Hatzidakis that defendant's
father owned the Dinaland Aviation building (Finding of Fact No.
10; R. 16 at 2 ) , it did not make a finding that defendant had
either a proprietary or valid possessory interest in the premises
such that he was in a position to assert a privacy interest
protected by the fourth amendment. At trial, defendant's father
testified that he gave defendant permission to have a party on
those premises (T. 49); however, the court did not include that
as one of its findings of fact, and defendant apparently never
objected to that omission. Without that critical finding of
fact, defendant has no basis upon which to claim a fourth
amendment privacy interest in the premises Officer Hatzidakis
sought to enter. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). This, of course,
seriously undermines defendant's argument that he had a right to
resist an illegal search, assuming that such a right exists, for
only those persons with a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the premises could claim the search was illegal as to them.

Defendant erroneously claims that because the search
was illegal, the State could not prove the officer was "acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer," as
required under section 76-5-102.4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l(l)
(Supp. 1989) defines a "peace officer" as:
any employee of a police or law enforcement
agency . . ., and whose duties consist
primarily of the prevention and detection of
crime and the enforcement of criminal
statutes or ordinances of this state or any
of its political subdivisions.
That provision recognizes that a peace officer's duties include
the enforcement of the criminal laws, precisely what Officer
Hatzidakis sought to do in making the entry into the building.
The better rule, as noted in State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz, at 148,
568 P.2d 1046, is that simply because a search or seizure is
subsequently judged to be unlawful, the officer is not deemed to
be acting outside the scope of the officer's authority.

A peace

officer is engaged in the performance of official duties (i.e.,
acting within the officer's scope of authority) if the officer is
"acting within the scope of what the agent is employed to do.
The test is whether the agent is acting within that compass or is
engaging in a personal frolic of his own."

Ibid.(quoting United

States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied,
388 U.S. 917 (1967)).
P.2d at 467.

See also State v. Doe, 92 N.M. at 103, 583

Cf. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053,

1056-57 (Utah 1989) (defining scope of employment).

There is no

evidence to support any conclusion other than that Officer
Hatzidakis was conducting a good faith search, something that
clearly comes within the scope of his duties and employment as a
peace officer.

Nor does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1978) provide a
justification for defendant's resistance to the search.

That

section provides:
A person is justified in using force,
other than deadly force, against another when
and to the extent that he reasonably believes
that force is necessary to prevent or
terminate criminal interference with real
property or personal property:
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a
member of his immediate family; or
(3) Belonging to a person whose property
he has a legal duty to protect.
There is no evidence of "criminal interference" by the officer.
Defendant's citation to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1989) (a copy of
which is contained in the addendum to defendant's brief), as
support for his contention that Officer Hatzidakis was guilty of
criminal interference, is not persuasive, as there is no evidence
that the officer "willfully" subjected defendant to the
deprivation of a constitutional right.

In short, the criminal

intent necessary for conviction under section 242, see, e.g.,
United States v. Harrison, 671 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 847 (1982), simply was not present.
For similar reasons, defendant's reliance on Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) is misplaced.

That section states in

pertinent part that:
a person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such force
is necessary to defend himself or a third
person against such other's imminent use of
unlawful force[.]
Section 76-2-402(1) (emphasis added).

Defendant's contention

that he was justified in using force against the officer under

this section is premised on his claim that the officer used
excessive force to effect the entry.

Whether the officer used

excessive force is primarily a question of fact.
Connor,

U.S.

,

See Graham v.

, 109 S.Ct. 1855, 1871-72 (1989);

Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2nd Cir. 1989).
This Court will set aside a trial court's finding of fact only
when that finding is "clearly erroneous," that is when it is
against the clear weight of the evidence.
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

State v. Walker, 743

See also State v. Featherson, 781

P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989).

Defendant fails to cite this

critical standard of review in attacking the trial court's
finding that "the force used was not excessive and that it was
reasonable in view of the circumstances" (Finding of Fact No. 12;
R. 16 at 2 ) . The record clearly contains adequate evidentiary
support for the court's specific finding regarding the question
of excessive force and the related findings of fact in support
thereof (See Finding of Fact No. 11; R. 16 at 2 ) . (T. 21-37).
Because defendant cannot successfully attack the trial court's
finding under the Walker standard, his self-defense claim under
section 76-2-402 fails as well.
In sum, defendant provides no basis for reversing the
court of appeals' affirmance of his conviction of assault on a
peace officer under section 76-5-102.4.
Based on the foregoing discussion, defendant's
challenge to his conviction of interference with a peace officer
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1989) can be disposed of
summarily.

That section provides:

A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to
effect a lawful arrest or detention of
himself or another and interferes with such
arrest or detention by use of force or by use
of any weapon.
The only claim defendant has with regard to his conviction under
this provision is that under the circumstances, the officer could
not have made a "lawful arrest," and defendant was therefore
justified in resisting an unlawful arrest.

Assuming, arguendo,

that one is not criminally liable under section 76-8-305 if the
arrest is unlawful, defendant still cannot prevail.

Because

defendant had no right to forcibly resist the officer's entry
into the Dinaland Aviation building--either under the Elson rule
or because there was both probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search--, his arrest for
assault under section 76-5-102.4 was lawful.

There being no

dispute that defendant interfered with that arrest by use of
force, his conviction under 76-8-305 also should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Insofar as that

court's decision did not address defendant's conviction of
interference with a peace officer under section 76-8-305, this
Court should independently affirm that conviction.
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